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Summary findings
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regulators  have helped poorer consumers.  of expanding  their networks  to reach millions  of
British  Telecommunications  offers  a lower  user tariff  unserved  (mostly  poor) customers.  The United  Kingdom
and a very cheap  service  with most outgoing  calls  barred,  achieved  nearly  universal  service  in geographical  terms
to attract customers  who could not afford the full  while the utilities  were state-owned.  The utilities  were
service.  serving  some customers  who were already  profitable  and
The gas regulator  has taken  action to reduce price  were simply  required to serve  others,  who might  not be.
differentials  between  customers  who pay in cash (mostly,  It might  be possible  to grant a concession,  or privatize
but not always,  poor customers)  and those who pay with  a new company,  on a similar  basis  of "bundling"  social
bank transfers  (mostly,  but not always,  better off  obligations  with opportunities  for profit, but it will be
customers).  important  to ensure  that obligations  are performed
The electricity  industry  faces  a series  of rules and codes  properly.  U.K.  regulators  have  been fairly  successful  at
of practice  governing  its dealings  with domestic  protecting  existing  customers;  other countries  may  be
consumers.  able to copy some of their techniques.
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I.  Introduction
Regulators exist to protect consumers,  but some need more protection than others. The new
style  of  regulation in  the  UK  has  recognised this  from  its  beginnings in  the  1984
Telecommunications  Act, but experience has gradually revealed the more effective ways to
help poorer consumers.  In this paper, I want to focus on a few issues, and discuss them
through case studies.
What issues are likely to be important to poorer consumers? In many parts of the
world, poorer consumers cannot physically get connected to  utility services, but  utility
networks cover the vast majority of consumers in the UK.'  While physical availability is not
an issue, affordability is - utility services may not be priced at a level which consumers can
afford.  The price level will be important for all consumers, of course, but it will be most
important for those whose needs are high relative to their incomes.  The regulator must
ensure that the regulated  companies can finance their activities, but should aim for the lowest
prices consistent with this.
The structure of prices can be as important as their overall level, for many poorer
consumers buy  below-average quantities of  utility services.  With  most  utility  tariff
structures, the average cost per unit declines as consumption rises, and  so those poorer
consumers may be paying more per unit than wealthy ones who consume greater quantities.
At the same time, however, some poorer consumers buy large amounts of gas or electricity,
and some wealthy consumers buy small amounts (particularly in "second homes").  This
illustrates the problems which might be caused by using something which the regulator can
measure (low consumption) as a proxy for another (poverty) that cannot be measured by the
1regulator.  British Telecommunications,  however, runs a "light user scheme" as part of its
universal service obligation,  which is discussed  in section III.
Being able to afford utility bills is one issue; actually paying them is another. Utilities
will need to offer their consumers a range of payment options, and many poor consumers will
value the ability to make frequent small payments  in cash - they may not have access to bank
accounts, and find it easier to budget for regular, small, payments than infrequent large ones.
Cash payments may be harder for the utility to process, however, and most British utilities
charge more for these than for payments made by automatic bank transfer (known as direct
debit in the UK).  They typically charge even more when the customer has a prepayment
meter, which must be "charged up" before consumption,  and costs more to install.  The size
of these differentials should be of concern  to the regulator, and section IV gives a case study
of British Gas' price differentials.
The way in which utilities act in dealing with their customers is another important
issue.  Do they provide adequate information in a form which customers (particularly those
speaking a foreign language, or the blind or deaf) can understand? How do utilities go about
attracting new customers in parts of their market which have been opened to competition?
What procedures are followed when customers  are in debt to the utility?  Section V gives a
case study of the codes of practice which electricity companies have to  follow in these
matters.
II  The Legal Framework
Each of the industry-specific  regulators in the UK was established by a separate Act of
Parliament, passed  between  1984 (telecommunications) and  1993 (rail).  These  Acts
established the office of regulator, required the companies in the industry to hold a licence
(issued either by the regulator or a Secretary of State) and converted state-owned Public
Corporations into companies which could then be privatised.  The aim was to create an
independent regulator who could use his or her powers in a flexible manner, but would be
guided by the legal duties  laid down by the Act.
'The main exception is gas, which is not available in many rural areas, because of the cost of expanding  the
network to cover these. Water, electricity and telephone  services,  however, are available to the overwhelming
majority of consumers  in the UK.
2The regulator's independence  should be a result of their appointment for fixed terms,
with mid-term removal only for incapacity or misbehaviour (although their appointment and
re-appointment is a matter for the Secretary of State). The regulators are able to appoint their
own staffs, subject to a budget set by the Treasury, but their resources usually come from
licence fees paid by the industry they regulate.
The regulators' duties are manifold. In the case of the Telecommunications  Act 1984,
for example,  the regulator's primary duties were "to secure that there are provided throughout
the United Kingdom ... such telecommunications  services as satisfy all reasonable demands
for them including, in particular, emergency services, public call box  services, directory
information services, maritime services and services in rural areas; and ... to secure that any
person ... is able to finance the provision of those services."  Subject to those primary duties,
the regulator was required "to promote the interests of consumers,  purchasers and other users
in the U.K. (including, in particular, those who are disabled or of pensionable age) in respect
of the  prices  charged  for,  and  the  quality  and  variety  of,  telecommunications  ..."  and  "to
maintain and promote effective competition" between telecommunications  companies. Other
secondary duties included the promotion of  efficiency and economy, and  research and
development,  on  the  part  of  telecommunications companies,  to  encourage  major
telecommunications users to locate within the UK, and to enable UK telecommunications
companies to  compete effectively outside the UK.  There were waivers where "national
security" or (for the secondary  duties) environmental  protection  conflicted with these duties.
Other regulators have similar duties, although each Act has its own variants.  The
Electricity Act  1989, for example, raises the promotion of competition to  a primary duty
(ahead of the protection of consumers, which is still a secondary duty) and also requires the
regulator to ensure that tariffs to consumers in designated areas of Scotland would not vary
by the customer's location, effectively to ensure that urban and rural areas had the same
prices.  The Labour government elected in 1997 has reviewed the regulatory system, and is
introducing a Utilities Bill which will make consumer  protection a primary duty for all of the
regulators, and replace some individual regulators with three-person commissions, which it
hopes will lead to greater continuity and consistency in decision-making. In particular, the
regulation of the gas industry and the electricity industry is being combined.  Since January
1999, the industries have had the same regulator, although he will continue to  hold two
3legally separate posts until the new Bill is passed. 2 The policies discussed in this paper
precede the merger, however, when the separate regulators sometimes followed different
policies.
Any company wishing to operate in a regulated industry (even in the competitive  part
of one) must have a licence, unless it is small enough to qualify for a de minimis exemption.
Some telecommunications  companies,  for example,  are covered  by class licences  with a small
number of standard conditions, but the major network monopolies still have individual
licences.  These lay down their rights and responsibilities, and can only be changed by
agreement, or after a ruling by the Competition  Commission  (previously  the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission). This "Court of Appeal" is intended to protect the company's interests
against arbitrary changes, while it is still easier to reflect changing conditions by changing a
licence than by passing a new Act of Parliament.
Licences are  used  to  set  out  general principles and  procedures, but  are  still
insufficiently detailed to  govern all  the day-to-day work of  regulation.  Much  of  the
regulator's time 3 will be spent responding to consumers' complaints about the companies'
actions, or  appeals against their  decisions (such  as the amount that must  be  paid for
connection to the network).  The regulator will generally produce a written decision, and
frequently publicise this, building up a set of case-law that should reduce the number of
appeals in future - companies will know what they are likely to be allowed to do in future.
The company may also be required to produce codes of practice - for example, on their
procedures  for marketing,  or dealing with customers  in debt - which the regulator will have to
approve.  Failure to follow the code is likely to  get the company into trouble, should a
customer subsequently  complain  to the regulator.
Regulators have gradually learned the value of openness, and now issue a series of
consultation  papers before changing a company's licence.  The first paper in the series may
only set out the issues to be considered,  but later papers are likely to indicate the regulator's
preferred solutions, and invite reactions to them, before they are finalised.  These papers
provide valuable  evidence about  the way in which the regulators' thinking has developed, and
2  fonner  Office  of Gas  Supply  (Ofgas)  and  Office  of Electricity  Regulation  (Offer)  have  already  been
combined into Ofgem - the Office of Gas and Electricity  Markets.
3 Or  to be more  accurate,  that  of the regulator's  staff,  since  individual  consumers'  cases  rarely  reach  the top of
the organisation.
4of the way in which they might treat issues which do not yet merit action, but might do so in
future,
III.  Universal Service in Telecommunications
The telecommunications regulator, OFTEL, has defined universal service as "affordable
access to basic telecommunication  services  for all those reasonably  requesting it regardless  of
where they live" (Oftel, 1995, para 4.3).  This has demand side and supply side aspects.
Some customers may not be  able to  afford the standard services provided by  BT and
Kingston Communications, 4 and universal service suggests that they should be  offered a
cheaper alternative so that they can at least be connected  to the network.  The supply side
aspect is implicit in the reference  to the customer's location. Some sparsely populated areas
might be uneconomic for the company to serve at any price - since demand decreases as
prices increase, and average costs rise as demand falls, there may be no "break-even" price.
In other areas, the demand curve might intersect the average cost curve at high prices, but
BT's licence requires it to charge the same prices throughout the UK.  This means that the
company would make losses in serving these areas.  Universal service implies that these
losses should not be a reason for refusing  to provide  these customers  with a connection. (The
requirement for geographical averaging is relaxed when a new line is required, as BT is
allowed  to levy an additional connection  charge where more than 100 person hours of work is
needed).
As well as uneconomic  areas, there are also uneconomic customers, typically those
who make (and receive)  few calls or have heavy customer  service costs (perhaps  because they
are bad at paying their bills on time).  The revenues from these customers (which should
include the payments made by other people for calls made to these customers) are less than
their costs, and a company might be reluctant to serve them - always assuming that it could
identify them in time to deny them service.
Note  that  universal  service  does  not  imply  selling  the  full  range  of
telecommunications  at a discounted price. A more recent objective for the regulator (which
makes reference to the government's concern over social exclusion) is "to ensure that those
4 BT is  the public telecommunications  operator for almost all of the UK, but Kingston  Communications
provides  telephone services in the area of Kingston  upon Hull. For brevity,  I will discuss  BT alone.
5telecommunications  services which are used by the majority and which are essential to full
social and economic  inclusion are made available to everybody  upon reasonable request in an
appropriate  fashion and at an affordable  price" (Oflel, 1999,  para 2.  10). Oftel has defined  the
basic package as "a connection to the fixed network able to support voice telephony and low
speed data and fax transmission" (para 2.30).  "All consumers should also be able to access
[emergency]  services  free, receive itemised bills, be able to choose selective call barring, and
have access to operator assistance and directory information; ... All consumers should be
given the option of an outgoing calls barred (OCB) service, together with a repayment  plan,
as an alternative to disconnection  for non-payment" (ibid).  To help with the demand side
aspect, customers  must also be given "the option of a more restricted service package at low
cost".
The universal  service obligation  also includes "reasonable geographic access  to public
call boxes across the UK at affordable  prices", since these provide access to the telephone  for
some people who do not have a phone at home. Again, many phone boxes are profitable, but
some are not.  BT cannot unilaterally remove uneconomic  boxes, and has agreed to install a
number of new boxes, expected to be uneconomic,  in places where there is a social need for
them.  Finally, Oftel also considers special services for disabled people as part of the
universal service obligation, in particular the touchtype service which allows deaf people to
send messages via a keyboard  and a "translation"  service (when the other party does not have
a keyboard).  Since my main focus is poverty, I will not discuss this aspect of universal
service in this paper.
In the UK, 93% of households have a home phone, and another 1% have access to a
mobile phone (but no fixed line). This leaves 1.35 million households without a phone, and
"two-thirds [of those] indicate, in market research surveys,  that they would like a home phone
but are deterred from having one, mainly because of the cost" (Oftel, 1997a, para 3.3).  BT
started to address this problem in 1983, when it offered the first in a series of residential low
user schemes.  These were designed to reduce the line rental for customers who made few
calls, although lines in second homes (for example)  were ineligible.
By  1997, however, Oftel were concerned that the most important barrier for the
remaining "unphoned"  households  was not only the level of BT's charges, but also the fear of
6getting into debt from making too many calls. 5 From 1998, BT has run an alternative  scheme,
the Residential Limited Service Scheme.  This was a cheap package which did not allow
people to make "charged" calls, and meant that they could not get into debt. They could only
phone the emergency services, freephone  numbers, and people who had previously arranged
to pay  for the call. 6 Oftel is monitoring the scheme to  check that it is  attracting new
customers to get a phone.
In 1997, Oftel also reported that it was pressing BT to provide a scheme allowing
people to pay for calls in advance, giving them complete control over their bills, (1997b,
3.25). The industry is evolving rapidly, however, and a number of other companies are now
selling pre-paid charge cards which provide a similar service. This shows how the industry is
evolving - what was once seen as part of the universal service obligation is now provided
voluntarily as part of the competitive  market.
The rest  of the universal service obligation may involve a  cost to  the provider,
however. When BT was a monopoly, it could simply absorb this cost -it was included in the
costs which the regulator took into account when setting the company's price control, in any
case.  The telecommunications  industry is becoming much more competitive, however, and
this approach could cause problems in a competitive  market. If one company has obligations
which another does not share, the second company will have an unfair advantage which could
distort competition between them.
There are two approaches to this problem (apart from the inadequate one of simply
ignoring it).  The first is to select one company to provide the service, and to set up a fund
which will meet the net costs of doing so. All the companies in the industry would contribute
to this fund in proportion to their revenues. While the incumbent would normally be chosen
to provide the service, it might be possible to "auction" uneconomic areas or customers, and
this approach is being considered by the Federal Communications  Commission in the United
States (Kelly and Steinberg,  forthcoming).
A more competitive alternative  is known as "pay or play", and could be applied to the
cost of offering low-cost basic services  - every company would choose whether or not to offer
' Many of the poorer people in the UK are fearful of getting into debt, a "cultural" factor which may date back
to the time when debtors could be sent to prison, and paupers to the workhouse  (Dickens, 1837, 1839).
6 This is a service which BT markets as "Call Me Free" -after dialling a special code (including a security
number) calls to the buyer's phone are charged  to their own bill. The buyers can pass on the code to people
who they wish to be able to call them free of charge, such as their children or elderly relatives.
7such services. If it did not offer the services, it would simply make payments into the fund
instead. If it chose to offer a low-cost  tariff, the fund would make a payment (which would
probably be based on BT's costs) for each customer it served.  This would allow for some
innovation  in the services  on offer, and companies  with lower costs than BT would be able to
earn a profit from these apparently  "uneconomic"  customers. Note that this would not apply
to services such as free emergency calls, which have to be provided by all operators in any
case.
Oftel has considered  both approaches  to funding universal service in the UK, but has
not yet implemented  either. This is because  it believes that the net cost of universal service is
very small, and too small to justify the cost of setting up and running a fund.  BT certainly
incurs some costs in providing universal services,  but it also gains some benefits, and Oftel
believes that these exceed the costs.
In 1997,  Oftel estimated that providing  universal service cost BT between £65 million
and £85 million in 1995/96,  in terms of the difference  between  the revenue earned by, and the
avoidable costs of, uneconomic  services. Oftel also believed that BT's operating costs were
5% higher than the best-performing  US local exchange carriers, and reducing BT's avoidable
costs by 5% would cut £20 million a year from the cost of universal service. The table gives
a break-down  of these figures:
Actual cost (£m)  Adjusted cost (£m)
Uneconomic  Areas  <0.5%  of lines  10-15  5-10
Uneconomic  Customers  6% - 7% of lines  45-55  30-40
Uneconomic  Call Boxes  20% of call boxes  10-15  10-15
Total  65-85  45-65
source: Oftel (1997a), Tables 6.1 and 6.2
Oftel also estimated some benefits from being  the universal  service provider. By supplying a
currently unprofitable customer, BT would increase the chance that it would be chosen by
that customer in the future, when they became profitable (the life cycle effect).  Only some
customers would become profitable in the future, of  course, and their future choice of
8supplier might not depend on their current supplier, which meant that this  benefit was
relatively low (at most £10 million a year, and possibly  only £1 million).
As the national company,  when people move area, almost all will be aware of BT, but
may not be aware of other companies operating in their new area.  BT will therefore win
some customers who would have switched to another company if they had known about it
(the ubiquity effect).  BT estimated that this effect was worth £3 million a year, but Oftel's
1997 estimate was of between £40 million  and £80 million a year. 7
BT's  corporate reputation is probably improved by its position as universal service
provider (the brand enhancement effect). This could be viewed as raising its market share,
but the high market share is already taken into account when the company's price control is
calculated,  and there would be a risk of double-counting  if it was also considered  as a benefit
of universal service (Oftel, 1997a, 6.31). Oftel's preferred  approach  was to view this effect as
a kind of advertising. BT's retail division spent over £250 million on marketing  in 1994/95,
and if the brand enhancement  effect was worth 20% of this (an arbitrary figure, admittedly),  it
would  give BT  £50 million a  year (6.32).  Public call  boxes could also  be  seen as
advertisements,  perhaps worth £11 rmillion  a year (6.35).
Oftel's calculations therefore suggested that BT's benefits from being the universal
service provider exceeded its costs, and that no special funding would be required.  The
regulator's detailed numbers might be open to question, but the general conclusion seems
appropriate, when only 7% of customers  are uneconomic,  and BT can spread the benefits
across roughly 90% of the UK market. If the universal service provider had a lower market
share, or if more lines were uneconomic,  then there might be more need to spread the costs of
universal service across the industry. Oftel is now (in the second half of 1999) reviewing  the
position.
IV.  Price differentials  in the gas industry
The previous section referred to the fear of getting into debt as one of the reasons why some
people did not have a home phone, and suggested that "pay as you go" schemes could be a
7Oftel  has  since  suggested  that  most  of this  benefit  comes  from  having  a large  national  network,  rather  than
supplying  the small  number  of uneconomic  areas,  and  so should  not  be offset  against  the cost  of providing
universal service in those areas (Oftel, 1999,  para 4.8).
9response to this.  In the energy industries,  prepayment meters are an increasingly common
response to the problem (or potential problem) of debt.  While a traditional meter accepted
coins in advance, and then released the amount of gas or electricity which had been paid for,
modem meters use magnetic cards, which must be charged up at a payment point (such as a
shop or post  office with  appropriate equipment).  This may be less convenient for  the
customer than a coin-operated meter, but means that the company does not have to collect
money from the meter itself, and avoids the risk of theft from the meter.
Although card-operated  meters may be cheaper to run than coin-operated  meters, they
are nevertheless more complicated  than normal meters (which only record consumption),  and
the utilities have argued that it is expensive  to run a large network of payment points, each of
which collects many small cash payments. Most companies' pre-payment  tariffs are therefore
significantly  above their other  tariffs. The standard  tariff is based on paying a bill every three
months for the consumption  up to that point (or an estimate  of it). The cheapest way to pay is
through a direct debit scheme, which makes automatic bank transfers from the customer's
account every month, equal to one-twelfth  of the customer's estimated annual bill.
Many of the people who use pre-payment meters are aware that they  are more
expensive than other ways of paying (Doble, 1998). Despite this, the majority of users are
happy to keep their meter, seeing it as a convenient way to budget for their gas and avoid
getting into debt. (Some meters are installed to recover debts, and these customers would not
be able to  change their payment method until the debt is repaid, but  85% of the other
customers in Doble's sample said they were happy to remain on prepayment meters, even
though they had been told how much they could save through direct debit).
Even if pre-payment meter customers seem willing to pay more for the features they
see as attractive, this does not mean that they should pay more.  On average, pre-payment
customers have  lower  incomes than  other  gas  consumers, although there  many  poor
customers do not have pre-payment meters, and some pre-payment customers have high
incomes.  On average, however, poor customers will be subsidising the rich if pre-payment
customers are paying more than their fair share of the gas industry's costs, and this seems
undesirable.
In 1994,  BG charged prepayment  customers  about 4% more than other customers, and
gave no discount for paying by direct debit (Waddams  Price and Bennett, 1999). From that
10year onward, however, BG started to "rebalance" its tariffs, in response to the prospect of
competition  in  the  domestic  market  (announced in  December  1993).  The  company
introduced a discount for paying by direct debit, and soon faced claims that this discriminated
against customers who helped the company by paying their bills promptly by cash or cheque,
and were (on average) less well-off than direct debit customers. The company responded by
giving a (smaller) discount to those who paid credit bills within ten days.
By November 1997, British Gas charged pre-payment customers 11% more than
standard credit customers, and direct debit customers 6Y2%  less. 8 Waddams Price and
Bennett argue that this was a response to the threat of competition, implying that BG thought
that the  1997 tariffs were more cost-reflective than the earlier ones.  New entrants have
typically set tariffs with a much greater differential between direct debit and prepayment
prices, and some did little to attract pre-payment  customers  in the first months of competition,
implying that they viewed direct debit customers  as more profitable at the prevailing prices.
To ensure that BG did not take this rebalancing too far as the market was opened to
competition (which happened in stages between April 1996 and 1998), the company's price
cap for 1997-2000 included a separate cap for each of its main tariffs - direct debit, credit
(with and without prompt payment) and pre-payment. BG was allowed to ask for the caps to
be rebalanced (within the overall total of allowed revenue),  however, and did so in July 1997.
Direct debit prices would have fallen by £6 a year (at the average consumption level), and
prompt payment prices by  £2.  Standard credit prices (without the discount for  prompt
payment) would have risen by £2.  BG proposed that the cap on pre-payment prices should
rise by £50 a year, or roughly one-sixth.
In September 1997, BG announced that it would cut its direct debit tariff by 9%, and
the prompt payment tariff by 8%.  The standard credit tariff would fall by only 1%, and
prepayment tariffs were not mentioned. The Gas Consumers Council (an independent  body,
established by  law, which represents consumers) asked Ofgas to  consider whether these
reductions constituted predatory pricing, and whether the failure to reduce prepayment prices
S  This is for the average consumption  level (across all tariff types) of 21 MWh/year. In practice, the direct debit
saving fell very slightly as consumption  increases  (at twice the average consumption, it was only 6.1%),. Pre-
payment meters have a lower minirnum charge, coupled  with a higher unit rate for the first 4.6 MWh per year.
Although the tariff is 11%  higher for all consumption  levels above 5 MWh per year, it is actually cheaper than
the standard tariff for consumption levels  below 3 MWh per year (one-seventh  of the average for all
consumers).
11constituted undue discrimination against those consumers (which was against the terms of
BG's licence).
Ofgas considered BG's  attributable costs and margins, and found that none of the
tariffs were  predatory (although pointing out that there were other dimensions of anti-
competitive behaviour which would have to be monitored).  The direct debit tariff had an
annual surplus of £7 over attributable costs (the majority of costs) and the other tariffs had
greater surpluses (Ofgas, 1999).  This was not unrelated to Ofgas' decision on whether the
tariffs were discriminatory - BG was required to reduce all of its other tariffs relative to the
direct debit tariff. The prepayment  tariff needed  the largest reductions,  and BG's licence was
changed so that pre-payment  customers  faced the same price cap as standard  credit customers
(excluding the prompt payment discount). Ofgas argued that although the meters were more
expensive, BG gained from being paid in advance, both in terms of cash flow and in reduced
credit risk.  Aligning the two price controls also ensured that BG did not have an artificial
incentive to install prepayment  meters when customers were in debt.  In a separate decision,
Ofgas reduced the charges which suppliers  had to pay for installing a prepayment meter and
for using the national network of payment points and card chargers (the Quantum settlement
system). Keeping these charges down will help keep prices down  for prepayment customers.
While Ofgas presently  believes that the true costs of pre-payment  customers in gas are
no higher than those of credit customers, most electricity companies still charge more.
Furthermore, customers who gain the discount for prompt payment of a credit bill are still
paying for their gas up to three months late, and this might seem unfair when compared  to the
prepayment customers  who pay in advance. In its consultation  paper on utility regulation,  the
govermnent suggested  that direct action should be taken to reduce prepayment  prices further.
One way to do this without distorting competition would be through the network tariffs paid
by every customer's supply company,  by setting a lower tariff for prepayment customers  than
for other customers. Suppliers could offset the discount against the higher costs which they
incur in dealing with prepayment customers,  and reduce the differential in retail prices (DTI,
1998a, 5.38).
The electricity regulator's response to this consultation paper opposed the idea of a
cross-subsidy (Offer, 1998a). Estimates of the extra costs involved differed widely, so that it
would not be easy to set the subsidy at the right level. The regulator suggested that suppliers
12might not pass on the subsidy unless regulation forced them to do so (and this kind of
regulation could well distort competition). 9 Both the  electricity regulator and the  gas
regulator pointed out that pre-payment  prices were falling, and promised to monitor this to
encourage companies to pass on cost reductions.  In its follow-up paper, the government
announced  that it would not introduce such a scheme at present, but would consider  doing so
if "market developments  do not allow disadvantaged  consumers  to receive a fair share of the
benefits of liberalisation"  (DTI, 1998b,  conclusion  5.1).
The  government had  said that legislation would be  needed to  make companies
disriminate in their prices in this way -many of the regulators have been extremely reluctant
to  collect revenue for purposes which they regard as  akin to  taxation.  The electricity
regulator  has included an energy efficiency  levy of £1 per customer  per year in price controls,
as did the first gas regulator, but his successor  refused to continue this.  Her point was that
general issues of taxation (and, presumably,  subsidies)  are a matter for Parliament, not for an
unelected  regulator.
The most important point about a subsidy for prepayment meter users, however, is
that many pre-payment  customers are not poor, and many poor customers do not have pre-
payment meters. This means that if the pre-payment  tariff is below the true costs imposed,
there will be a cross-subsidy  which will, in some cases, be from poorer to richer customers.
In a country like the UK, which already runs a complex system of targeted  benefits, changes
to the benefit system are likely to be a better way of helping poorer consumers than a badly
targeted  cross-subsidy  within energy  prices.
V  Codes of Practice in the Electricity  Industry
Most of the time, utilities do not need to have much contact with their customers, and the
dealings  they do have go smoothly. When things go wrong, however, a lot of distress can be
caused,  and much of this may be unnecessary. Licence conditions  and codes of practice  have
been agreed in the UK, which set out the standards  and procedures  which the utilities should
follow.  The codes are designed to protect all consumers, but poorer consumers, who are
9 If competition is not strong enough to make companies  keep prices down to the level of their costs net of a
subsidy, however, would it be strong enough to keep prices down to the level of the costs without  the subsidy?
The presence of a subsidy does not seem  to affect the case for continued  regulation  where competition  is weak.
13more likely to have debt problems, and may be less skilled at dealing with an (occasionally
bureaucratic) organisation, may gain more than most from the existence of the codes -as long
as they are followed.
The present set of licence conditions  were agreed in preparation for full competition in
the electricity market - the first domestic customers were allowed to choose their electricity
supplier in  September 1998.  Any company wishing to  supply "designated customers"
(domestic customers, and others with an annual consumption of less than 12 MWh) has a
similar set of obligations.  The licence quoted is that of Independent Energy (Offer, 1998b),
but other "second tier supply licences" should be practically  identical.
The first condition (at least in  terms of a  company's dealings with  a  customer)
concerns marketing.  Companies are required to  "set  up appropriate procedures for  the
selection of [marketing] staff', "take all reasonable steps to ensure that [their staff are] trained
so as  ... any relevant advice given... is not  misleading" and ensure that the company's
representatives identify the company properly (Offer, 1998b, Condition 51).  Furthermore,
unsolicited contacts made on behalf of the company must be at a reasonable time, and the
condition also applies to the company's agents and sub-contractors. Once customers have
signed a contract, the company must contact them' 0 to ensure that they are aware that they
have signed a contract (some customers were told they were signing a "request for further
information"), that they are content to have done so, and that  they are content with the
marketing activities of the company.  If the customer is not content, the contract must be
terminated, and a customer who is adversely affected by a breach of the condition must be
compensated.
Another licence condition requires the company to offer a contract to all designated
customers, and  supply all  customers who  accept the  contract terms,  unless  "it  is  not
reasonable in all the circumstances" (Condition 29).  This exception presumably allows the
company to  disconnect customers who fail to pay their bills.  However, the company is
required to  agree a  code of practice on payment of bills  with the regulator,  including
procedures which the company would have to follow before it disconnected any customers
(condition 30).  The code should include procedures by which the company can distinguish
customers who are in difficulty paying their bills from others in default, and help those who
are in difficulty.  This should include making arrangements for the arrears to  be paid in
14installments which the customer can afford (and monitoring compliance with these),"  or
offering a prepayment  meter (also calibrated to recover the debt at an affordable rate).  The
companies should also offer advice on using electricity  efficiently,  in the hope that this might
reduce any excessive consumption  which is worsening  the consumers' situation. Finally, the
code must "have particular  regard..  to the interests  of .. customers  who are of pensionable age
or disabled or chronically sick and to the purpose of avoiding, so far as is practicable,  the
disconnection  of .. such customers  during the winter  months" (Condition  30.3).
Another condition (31) sets out the services which must be provided for elderly,
disabled or sick customers. If required,  the company  must arrange to send the customer's bill
(or a copy) to a third party - this would be useful for a customer  who might have difficulty  in
remembering  to pay a bill!  The company can only supply designated customers  according  to
the terms of standard contracts (condition 42) and must take all reasonable steps to bring
those terms to the customer's attention (condition 44).  The company is required to offer a
range of payment methods, including prepayment meters, cash and cheque, and a range of
payment intervals including the industry's  standard methods of  predetermined monthly
payments, and quarterly bills paid in arrears (condition  43).  The company may not require a
security deposit if the customer is supplied through a prepayment meter, or "where it is
otherwise  unreasonable  in all the circumstances  to do so" (condition  45).  If a deposit is held,
it should normally be  11/ 2 times the customer's expected quarterly bill, and interest must be
paid on it, at a rate determined by the regulator.  Contracts must be terminable on 28 days'
notice (or 2 days' notice, when the customer  is moving (in which case the new occupier will
be supplied  by the company)),  and a termination  fee is only payable if the contract had a fixed
term period (condition  46).
When things do go wrong, despite the licence conditions and codes, the regulator is
able to receive complaints  from consumers, and can require companies to pay compensation.
Many complaints  are resolved  by the regulator's staff, working in regional offices (in general,
one  for  each  Regional  Electricity Company), but  some  are  taken  to  the  Electricity
Consumers' Consultative Committee for the region.  Committee members are volunteers,
appointed by the regulator and supported by his staff, with a part-time chairperson.  The
'°The person making the contact must not themselves  be employed  in gaining new customers  for the company.
"Organisations such as the Citizens' Advice  Bureaux (a voluntary,  but state-supported,  network of drop-in
advice centres) are experienced  in negotiating  repayment  plans with the utilities on behalf of indebted
customers.
15regulator will include the committees in any consultation exercise, in which they try to
represent the viewpoint of ordinary  consumers.
The regulator's annual reports give (anonymised)  examples of the complaints which
have to be resolved.  Disputed bills are a major source of complaints.  Customers' meters
should be read every three months, but if the meter is inside a house which is unoccupied
during the day, there may be long periods with no meter reading, during which bills are
estimated. If the estimates are incorrect  (particularly  if the company has made a mistake in
reading the meter), the customer  may have paid too little for electricity,  and the company  may
issue an  abnormally large bill to recover the difference.  The regulator has sometimes
intervened to reduce the amount of catch-up, particularly if the under-payments were the
company's fault.  Another example concemed a customer,  with a coin-operated  prepayment
meter, who suffered a burglary.  Money was stolen from the meter, which the company
treated as a debt to be repaid by the customer,  until the regulator intervened (Offer, 1993, p.
66).  Offer can also intervene if a company asks a customer to give a security deposit when
this would be unreasonable, or asks for too high a deposit.  According to the regulator's
survey of customers  who had made complaints  in 1998, 80% were satisfied with the outcome
of their complaint, and 89% found the service provided by Offer useful - 94% said they
would recommend  the service to others (Offer, 1999,  p.79).
VI  Conclusions
The regulators' most visible actions typically concern  the average level of prices, and keeping
average prices down is an important  help to poorer customers. These case studies have been
chosen to show some of the other things that British regulators have done that help poorer
customers. Note that I have written "that help" rather than "to help", for the schemes  I have
described are available to all, and some poor consumers will not take advantage of them.  It
would be extremely difficult to target help more directly without means-testing consumers,
and comparing their incomes to their needs. Means tests are used in a few schemes - some
poorer consumers have been given grants towards home insulation or more energy-efficient
appliances,  funded by the levy for energy efficiency  discussed  in section V, but these are the
exception. In general, the UK has a reasonably  effective system of targeted welfare benefits.
16If this system did not exist, there might be a case for using the utilities as the best available
instrument for helping the poor, but only if there is little chance of setting  up a more effective
direct policy.
The other main challenge facing utilities in some countries is that of expanding their
networks to reach millions of unserved, mostly poor, consumers. The UK achieved a nearly
universal service in geographical  terms while the utilities were still in state ownership.  If
cross-subsidies  were needed to expand the networks, they were never explicit.  The utility
was serving some customers  who were already profitable, and was simply required to serve
others, who might not be.  It might be possible to grant a concession, or privatise a new
company,  on a similar basis of "bundling"  social obligations  with opportunities  for profit, but
it will be important  to ensure that the obligations are performed properly. Unfortunately,  the
UK's experience offers few other lessons for the task of network expansion. UK regulators
have been fairly successful at protecting existing customers, however, and I  hope other
countries may be able to copy some of the techniques.
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